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Abstract
We introduce a formal model for certificateless authenticated key exchange (CL-AKE) protocols.
Contrary to what might be expected, we show that the natural combination of an ID-based AKE
protocol with a public key based AKE protocol cannot provide strong security. We provide the first
one-round CL-AKE scheme proven secure in the random oracle model. We introduce two variants of
the Diffie-Hellman trapdoor introduced by [CKS08]. The proposed key agreement scheme is secure
as long as each party has at least one uncompromised secret. Thus, our scheme is secure even if the
key generation centre learns the ephemeral secrets of both parties.
1 Introduction
Certificateless encryption introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [ARP03] is a variant of identity
based encryption that limits the key escrow capabilities of the key generation centre, which is inherent
in identity based encryption [BF03]. Dent [Den08] published a survey of more than twenty certificateless
encryption schemes that focuses on the different security models and the efficiency of the respective
schemes. In certificateless cryptography schemes, there are three secrets per party:
• The key issued by the key generation centre (Dent [Den08] calls it “partial private key”). We
assume in the following that this key is ID-based, although it does not necessarily have to be
ID-based.
• The user generated private key xID (Dent calls it “secret value”).
• The ephemeral value chosen randomly for each session.
Key agreement schemes provide an efficient means for two parties to communicate over an adver-
sarial controlled channel. An overview of almost twenty identity based key agreement protocols has been
compiled by Chen, Cheng and Smart [CCS07]; they also provide security proofs for two of the surveyed
protocols. Many ID-based schemes guarantee full privacy for both parties as long as the key generation
centre (KGC) does not learn any of the ephemeral secrets used in computing the session key. But as
Krawczyk [Kra05] points out, the leakage of ephemeral keys should not be neglected as they are usually
precomputed and not stored in secure memory. In the context of identity based key agreement protocols,
this means that as soon as the ephemeral key of either party leaks, a malicious KGC is able to compute
the session key.
An overview of current certificateless key agreement schemes has been compiled by
Swanson [Swa08]. Certificateless key agreement schemes attempt to provide full privacy even if the
ephemeral secrets of the parties leak to the key generation centre or if the key generation centre actively
interferes with the messages that are exchanged (e.g. does a man-in-the-middle attack). The first
certificateless key agreement scheme was published by Al-Riyami and Paterson [ARP03] as a side note to
their certificateless encryption scheme. However, they provided neither a security model for certificateless
key agreement schemes nor a proof of security for the scheme. Other certificateless key agreement schemes
were published by Mandt and Tan [MT06] and improved by Xia et al. [XWSX08], Wang, Cao and Wang
[WCW06], and Shao Zu-hua [Zh05], but the respective authors gave only heuristic arguments as to
why their schemes would be secure. Swanson [Swa08] analysed these certificateless schemes and showed
generic attacks that break the notions of security claimed by the respective authors. Swanson also posed
three open questions in the last chapter of her thesis that we will answer in this paper.
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By combining an ID-based scheme with a public key based scheme, certificateless encryp-
tion [YL04a], [LQ06], certificateless signatures [YL04b], and certificateless key encapsulation mechanisms
[BFMLS08] can be readily constructed from existing protocols. Contrary to what would be expected,
we show that a certificateless key agreement protocol cannot be securely constructed by a natural com-
bination of an ID-based key agreement protocol with a public key based key agreement protocol.
The security model is an extension of Swanson’s [Swa08] modified version of the extended Canetti
and Krawczyk model presented in [LLM07] for certificateless key agreement. In this paper, we strengthen
the model further (thus giving more power to the adversary) and provide the first formal proof for a
strongly secure certificateless key agreement scheme in the random oracle model. Moreover, the protocol
we propose is a one round protocol that withstands all of Swanson’s attacks, although the messages
exchanged in our protocol are exactly the same messages as in Mandt and Tan’s protocol [MT06]. To
withstand the attacks we use a modified version of the technique presented by Xia et al. [XWSX08].
We prove that our certificateless key agreement protocol is secure even if the key generation centre
actively tries to break the scheme: it may either reveal ephemeral secrets or reveal secret values / replace
public keys but not both. In fact, we show that as long as each party still has at least one uncompromised
secret, our scheme is still secure in the random oracle model assuming that the computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption and the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption hold. Our proofs are in
the strongest security model available for certificateless schemes, i.e. it corresponds to Dent’s [Den08]
Strong Type I and Strong Type II security where the adversary is allowed to replace certificateless public
keys and the challenger still has to answer all oracle queries.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• Strongest formal model for secure authenticated certificateless key exchange protocols today. We
provide the equivalent of a strong decryption oracle [Den08] for reveal queries.
• An analysis of why certificateless key establishment schemes (CL-AKE) cannot be readily composed
by combining an ID-based authenticated key establishment (ID-AKE) scheme with a public key
authenticated key establishment (PK-AKE) scheme in our security model.
• First one-round protocol for certificateless key agreement with a security proof in the random
oracle model that fulfills all notions of security of our model and withstands recent attacks on
certificateless key agreement protocols.
The organization of the paper is as follows: we introduce the security model in Section 2 and
relate it to existing notions of security for key agreement schemes and certificateless encryption. We also
show why a generic composition of ID-AKE with PK-AKE does not have sufficient security guarantees
in our model. A description of the scheme is given in Section 3 on page 6. Section 5 on page 10 discusses
the security proof of the new protocol. We conclude our paper by answering some open questions in
Section 6 on page 18.
2 Security model for certificateless key agreement schemes
The following security properties are commonly required of key establishment protocols in general.
Resistance to basic impersonation attacks. An adversary who does not know the private key of
party A should not be able to impersonate A.
Resistance to Unknown Key-Share (UKS) attacks. An adversaryM interferes with two honest
parties A and B such that both parties accept the session and compute the same key. However,
while A thinks that the key is shared with B, B is convinced that the key is shared with M.
Known key security. Each run of a key agreement protocol between two parties A and B should
produce a unique session key. A protocol should not become insecure if the adversary has learned
some of the session keys [LMQ+03].
Weak Perfect Forward Secrecy (wPFS). A key-exchange protocol provides weak PFS (wPFS)
if an attacker M cannot distinguish from random a key of any session for which the session and
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its matching session are clean1 even if M has learned the private keys of both peers to the ses-
sion [Kra05, Definition 22].
Resistance to Key-Compromise Impersonation (KCI) attacks. We say that a KE-attacker M
that has learned the private key of party Aˆ succeeds in a Key-compromise impersonation (KCI)
attack against Aˆ if M is able to distinguish from random the session key of a complete session at
Aˆ for which the session peer is uncorrupted and the session and its matching session (if it exists)
are clean [Kra05, Definition 20].
Resistance to disclosure of ephemeral secrets. The protocol should be resistant to the disclo-
sure of ephemeral secrets. The disclosure of an ephemeral secret should not compromise the security
of sessions where the ephemeral secret was not used.
ID-based protocols usually require the following property in addition to these properties:
KGC forward secrecy The key generation centre (KGC) should be unable to compute the session
key knowing all publicly available information.
For certificateless protocols, we will additionally require the following property. Mandt & Tan [MT06]
call this property “Resistance to known session-specific temporary information”, but they provide only
an informal definition. It is not possible to provide this property in an ID-based key agreement scheme
since a KGC who knows the ephemeral secrets has all inputs to the session key.
Resistance to leakage of ephemeral secrets to the KGC. If a malicious KGC learns the ephemeral
secrets of any session, the KGC should not be able to compute the session key.
2.1 Formal definition of the security model
We present a strengthened version of Swanson’s [Swa08] model, which in turn is based on LaMacchia,
Lauter & Mityagin’s [LLM07] extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. We discuss the changes to the
respective models in Section 2.2 on page 5.
Let U = {U1, . . . Un} be a set of parties. The protocol may be run between any two of these parties.
For each party there exists an identity based public key that can be derived from its identifier. There is
a key generation centre that issues identity based private keys to the parties through a secure channel.
Additionally, the parties generate their own secret values and certificateless public keys.
The adversary is in control of the network over which protocol messages are exchanged. Πti,j represents
the tth protocol session which runs at party i with intended partner party j. Additionally, the adversary
is allowed to replace certificateless public keys that are used to compute the session key. The adversary
does not have to disclose the private key matching the replaced certificateless public key to the respective
party.
A session Πti,j enters an accepted state when it computes a session key SK
t
i,j . Note that a session
may terminate without ever entering into an accepted state. The information of whether a session has
terminated with acceptance or without acceptance is assumed to be public. The session Πti,j is assigned
a partner ID pid = (IDi, IDj). The session ID sid of Πti,j at party i is the transcript of the messages
exchanged with party j during the session. Two sessions Πti,j and Π
u
j,i are considered matching if they
have the same pid (and sid).
The game runs in two phases. During the first phase of the game, the adversary M is allowed to
issue the following queries in any order:
Send(Πti,j , x): If the session Π
t
i,j does not exist, it will be created as initiator at party i if x = λ, or
as a responder at party j otherwise. If the participating parties have not been initiated before,
the respective private and public keys are created. Upon receiving the message x, the protocol is
executed. After party i has sent and received the last set of messages specified by the protocol, it
outputs a decision indicating accepting or rejecting the session. In the case of one-round protocols,
party i behaves as follows:
x = λ: Party i generates an ephemeral value and responds with an outgoing message only.
1Roughly speaking clean is the same as fresh in Definition 1 on the following page.
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x 6= λ: If party i is a responder, it generates an ephemeral value for the session and responds with
an outgoing message m and a decision indicating acceptance or rejection of the session. If
party i as an initiator, it responds with a decision indicating accepting or rejecting the session.
In this work, we require i 6= j, i.e. a party will not run a session with itself.
Reveal master key The adversary is given access to the master secret key.
Session key reveal(Πti,j): If the session has not accepted, it returns ⊥, otherwise it reveals the accepted
session key.
Reveal ID-based secret(i): Party i responds with its ID-based private key, e.g. sH1(IDi).
Reveal secret value(i): Party i responds with its secret value xi that corresponds to its certificateless
public key. If i has been asked the replace public key query before, it responds with ⊥.
Replace public key(i, pk): Party i’s certificateless public key is replaced with pk chosen by the adver-
sary. Party i will use the new public key for all communication and computation.
Reveal ephemeral key(Πti,j): Party i responds with the ephemeral secret used in session Π
t
i,j
We can group the key reveal queries into three types: the reveal master key and reveal ID-based secret
queries try to undermine the security of the ID-based part of the scheme, the reveal secret value and
replace public key queries try to undermine the security of the public key based part of the scheme, and
the reveal ephemeral key query tries to undermine the security of one particular session.
We define the state fully corrupt as a session that was asked all three types of reveal queries: the
reveal master key or reveal ID-based secret, the reveal secret value or the replace public key, and the reveal
ephemeral key query.
Once the adversary M decides that the first phase is over, it starts the second phase by choosing a
fresh session Πti,j and issuing a Test(Π
t
i,j) query, where the fresh session and test query are defined as
follows:
Definition 1 (Fresh session). A session Πti,j is fresh if (1) Π
t
i,j has accepted; (2) Π
t
i,j is unopened (not
being issued the session key reveal query); (3) the session state at neither party participating in this
session is fully corrupted; (4) there is no opened session Πuj,i which has a matching conversation to Π
t
i,j.
Test(Πti,j) The input session Π
t
i,j must be fresh. A bit b ∈ {0, 1} is randomly chosen. If b = 0, the
adversary is given the session key, otherwise it randomly samples a session key from the distribution
of valid session keys and returns it to the adversary.
After the test(Πti,j) query has been issued, the adversary can continue querying except that the test
session Πti,j should remain fresh. We emphasize here that partial corruption is allowed as this is a benefit
of our security model. Additionally, replace public key queries may be issued to any party after the test
session has been completed.
At the end of the game, the adversary outputs a guess bˆ for b. If bˆ = b, we say that the adversary
wins. The adversary’s advantage in winning the game is defined as
AdvM(k) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[M wins]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Definition 2 (Strong Type I secure key agreement scheme). A certificateless key agreement scheme
is Strong Type I secure if every probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary M has negligible advantage in
winning the game described in Section 2.1 on the preceding page subject to the following constraints:
• M may corrupt at most two out of three types of secrets per party involved in the test session,
• M is allowed to replace public keys of any party; however, this counts as the corruption of one
secret,
• M may not reveal the secret value of any identity for which it has replaced the certificateless public
key,
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• M is allowed to ask session key reveal queries even for session keys computed by identities where
M replaced the identity’s public key.
• M is allowed to replace public keys of any party after the test query has been issued.
Definition 3 (Strong Type II secure key agreement scheme). A certificateless key agreement scheme
is Strong Type II secure if every probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary M has negligible advantage in
winning the game described in Section 2.1 on page 3 subject to the following constraints:
• M is given the master secret key s at the start of the game,
• M may corrupt at most one additional type of secret per party participating in the test query,
• M is allowed to replace public keys of any party; however, this counts as the corruption of one
secret,
• M may not reveal the secret value of any identity for which it has replaced the certificateless public
key,
• M is allowed to ask session key reveal queries even for session keys computed by identities where
he replaced the identity’s public key.
• M is allowed to replace public keys of any party after the test query has been issued.
2.2 Relation to existing notions of security
Swanson’s [Swa08] replace public key query is weaker in assuming that the party whose key was replaced
continues to make its computations with its original (unreplaced) public key (and its matching private
key). Although it seems that Swanson’s model is more “natural” than our model, strong certificateless
encryption has been the goal of many papers, a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks can be found
in [DLP08]. As it gives more power to the adversary, we think that schemes that are strongly secure are
preferable to those in a weaker security model.
When checking for a matching conversation, Swanson omits the certificateless public keys from the
conversation transcript. This weakens the adversary compared to our model, as the adversary would not
be allowed to replace public keys and try to replay the conversation with the replaced keys of the test
query after the test query has been issued.
With respect to LaMacchia et al. [LLM07], the main difference of our definition is that instead of
having only four pieces of secret information, in certificateless protocols there are six: the ID-based secret
keys, the user’s secret value, and the ephemeral private keys of both parties. We require a certificateless
AKE to be secure as long as each party still holds at least one uncompromised secret.
We note that as the challenger has to answer session key reveal queries even for keys where the
respective certificateless public keys have been replaced, the adversary has access to the equivalent of a
“Strong Decrypt” oracle in certificateless encryption. Strong decryption oracles were first introduced by
Al-Riyami and Paterson [ARP03]. Dent [Den08] defines the Strong Decryption Oracle as follows.
Definition 4 (Strong Decryption Oracle). The adversary supplies an identity ID and a ciphertext C,
and the challenger responds with the decryption of C under the private key skID. Note that if the attacker
has replaced the public key for ID, then this oracle should return the correct decryption of C using the
private key that inverts the public key pkID currently associated with the identity ID (or ⊥ if no such
private key exists).
A strong decryption oracle in public key cryptography is able to return the plaintext for a given
ciphertext (which does not necessarily mean that the plaintext has been decrypted using the correct key,
as with double encryption). We note that in a session key reveal query the correct key for a given session
has to be revealed, which is a stronger requirement. The scheme in Section 3 on the following page is
both Strong Type I and Strong Type II secure with respect to Dent’s definitions.
In the security proof in Section 5 on page 10 and Section 5.4 on page 14 we do not differentiate
between these two types of adversarial behaviour but treat them together. If the adversary was split to
be either Strong Type I or Strong Type II, then a Strong Type II adversary would be applicable only
for the Strategies 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Section 5.1 on page 11. Being able to distinguish between Type I and
Type II adversaries would thus increase the probability of success for the challenger.
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2.3 Why a natural composition of CL-AKE from ID-AKE and PK-AKE is
not possible in our model
In the security model, a session can only be fresh as long as each party still has at least one uncompromised
secret. A composition of an ID-AKE with a PK-AKE is depicted in Figure 1. A natural way to achieve
such a composition consists of running the two protocols in parallel and deriving the session key of
the overall composition as a publicly known function of solely the two component session keys. This
composition cannot offer the desired level of security, because no security guarantees exist if party A still
has an uncompromised key in the PK-AKE and party B still has an uncompromised key in the ID-AKE
(both AKE schemes are broken at this moment). This may explain why no CL-AKE schemes with a
proof of security have been published before.
Public Key AKE
Party A Party B
pkA pkB
ephpkA ephpkB
KCI
eph discl
I
wPFS
+
ID-based AKE
Party A Party B
IDA IDB
ephIDA ephIDB
KCI
eph discl
wPFS
6=
Certificateless AKE
Party A Party B
pkA pkB
IDA IDB
ephpkA , ephIDA ephpkB , ephIDB
eph + pk discl
eph + ID discl
KCI KC
I
wPFS
KCI
The lines indicate what combination of secrets gives resistance against which attack type. Examples
for public key schemes applicable to this diagram would be NAXOS [LLM07] and CMQV [Ust08], an
example for an ID-based scheme would be the ASIACCS09 [HC08] scheme. However, a combination of
these schemes would not have any security guarantees about the dashed lines in the certificateless part
of the diagram.
Figure 1: PK-AKE + ID-AKE 6= CL-AKE
3 Description of the certificateless key agreement scheme
We describe the phases of our certificateless authenticated key exchange protocol in this section. Our
protocol consists of three phases: setup, message exchange and key computation. We also briefly address
the efficiency of the proposed protocol.
3.1 Setup
• The KGC publishes a generator P ∈ G and an admissible bilinear pairings map e : G × G → GT
that fulfills the following criteria:
Let G and GT be groups of prime order p. A bilinear pairings map e : G ×G → GT between the
groups G and GT satisfies the following properties:
Bilinear We say that a map e : G×G→ GT is bilinear if e(aP, bP ) = e(P, P )ab for all P ∈ G and
a, b ∈ Zp.
Non-degenerate We say that e is non-degenerate if it does not send all pairs in G×G to the identity
in GT . Since G and GT are groups of prime order p, it follows that if P ∈ G is a generator of
G, then e(P, P ) is a generator of GT .
Computable There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for any P,Q ∈ G.
Suitable pairing groups for this protocol would be Type 1 and Type 4 pairings (see Chen, Cheng
& Smart [CCS07] for a discussion). Asymmetric pairings are not possible because we use the non-
interactive ID-based key agreement of Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara (SOK) [SOK00] as part of our
protocol. This requires hashing to both G1 and G2. The SOK protocol has been proven by Dupont
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and Enge [DE02] using gap assumptions. As an added benefit of our proof, we show how to prove
the SOK protocol secure under the weaker computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption using
the twin bilinear Diffie-Hellman trapdoor [CKS08] in section 5.4 on page 14, Strategy 9.
• The KGC picks a random s ∈ Zp as master secret key and sets its public key to sP
• The KGC selects three cryptographic hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G
H2 : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ ×G8 ×GT 6 → {0, 1}n for some integer n > 0
H3 : G→ G
H2 is the key derivation function for our scheme.
Each party participating in the key agreement protocol additionally computes a private key and a match-
ing certificateless public key:
• Each user U generates a secret value xU $← Zp and a public key xUP ∈ G
• Each user U gets an ID-based private key {sH1(IDU ), sH3(H1(IDU ))} ∈ G2 from the key gener-
ation centre.
3.2 Message exchange
To establish a common key, user A generates the ephemeral secret rA
$← Zp and user B generates the
ephemeral secret rB
$← Zp. They exchange the following messages:
A→ B : EA = (rAP, xAP ) B → A : EB = (rBP, xBP )
We note that the certificateless public keys can be stripped from the messages if they are published in
a public online directory. This will save bandwidth, but at the same time may make the scheme more
vulnerable to the equivalent of denial of decryption attacks in certificateless encryption: an adversary
may manipulate the entries of the directory more easily than the message exchange between two parties.
As we propose a one-round protocol, our protocol achieves only implicit authentication. Krawczyk
[Kra05, Section 8] shows that explicit authentication is possible with three half rounds. To achieve explicit
authentication, this protocol can be patched in the same way that HMQV is patched to HMQV-C.
In the following we require implicitly that each party always checks subgroup membership for all
elements of messages that are exchanged in the protocol to defend against small subgroup attacks [LL97].
3.3 Key computation
To compute the certificateless session key, each user computes
KA = e(H1(IDB), sP )rAe(sH1(IDA), rBP )
= e(H1(IDB), P )rAse(H1(IDA), P )rBs = KB = K
K ′A = e(H3(H1(IDB)), sP )
rAe(sH3(H1(IDA)), rBP )
= e(H3(H1(IDB)), P )rAs · e(H3(H1(IDA)), P )rBs = K ′B = K ′
LA = e(H1(IDB), sP )xAe(sH1(IDA), xBP )
= e(H1(IDB), P )xAse(H1(IDA), P )xBs = LB = L
L′A = e(H3(H1(IDB)), sP )
xAe(sH3(H1(IDA)), xBP )
= e(H3(H1(IDB)), P )xAse(H3(H1(IDA)), P )xBs = L′B = L
′
NA = e(H1(IDB), sH1(IDA)) = e(H1(IDB), H1(IDA))s = NB = N
N ′A = e(H3(H1(IDB)), sH3(H1(IDA)))
= e(H3(H1(IDB)), H3(H1(IDA)))s = N ′B = N
′
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The session key is then computed as SK = H2(A, B, EA, EB , rArBP, xAxBP, rAxBP, xArBP, K, K ′,
L, L′, N, N ′). In Section 5 on page 10 and Section 5.4 on page 14 the challenger B uses the adversary
M to solve either the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) or the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(CBDH) problem. K,L, and N are used in the proof to embed the input to the CBDH challenge into
the test session. Each of these values is necessary to defend against one possible attack strategy of the
adversary M. K is the product of two encapsulated Boneh-Franklin session keys, L′ is similar but with
certificateless long-term keys. N ′ is the non-interactive ID-based key agreement scheme proposed by
[SOK00]. K ′, L′, and N ′ are needed to answer reveal queries of the adversaryM consistently. To answer
reveal queries, the challenger B makes use of the twin bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem as introduced by
Cash, Kiltz and Shoup [CKS08]. The twin bilinear Diffie-Hellman “backdoor” is embedded in K ′, L′ and
N ′.
3.4 Efficiency considerations
Although the protocol is one round, the computational overhead imposed on the parties is rather high:
each party has to compute 5 exponentiations in G and 10 pairings. We would like to note that we need
the H3 hash function in the proof for full computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman security. If the gap
bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption is used (see Kudla and Paterson [KP05] for gap assumptions), the
H3 hash function can be omitted which saves 2 hash queries and reduces the complexity of the protocol
to 3 exponentiations in G and 5 pairing computations (as K ′, L′, and N ′ do not have to be computed).
If there are multiple runs of the protocol between the same users (e.g. for rekeying in VPN’s), then the
complexity can be reduced by caching xAxBP , L, L′, N , and N ′ in secure memory which then reduces
the complexity for successive runs to 4 exponentiations and 4 pairing computations (or 2 exponentiations
and 2 pairing computations if the gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption is used). It may be possible
to do better in terms of computational efficiency. However, the aim of this paper is to provide a strong
model for certificateless key agreement and to show that schemes corresponding to the model exist.
We introduce the theorems that we later use as decisional oracles to be able to answer the H2 queries
of the adversary consistently (and to determine when the adversary submits the solution to a hard
problem to the H2 oracle). We continue then by embedding a hard problem in each of the uncorrupted
secrets that are available in the respective strategies.
4 The Twin Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Trapdoor Theorems
The proof in section 5.4 on page 14 for Strategy 5 to 8 relies heavily on the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Trapdoor Test). Let e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing, where G,GT are two cyclic
groups of prime order p. Let P ∈ G be a generator of G. Suppose B1 ∈ G, y, z ∈ Zp are mutually
independent random variables. Define B2 := yP −zB1. Further, suppose that A,C are random variables
in G and T1, T2 are random variables in GT , each of which is defined as some function of B1 and B2.
Then we have:
1. B2 is uniformly distributed over G.
2. B1 and B2 are independent.
3. If B1 = b1P and B2 = b2P , then the probability that the truth value of
T z1 · T2 ?= e(A,C)y (1)
does not agree with the truth value of
T1
?= e(A,C)b1 ∧ T2 ?= e(A,C)b2 (2)
is at most 1/p, moreover, if Equation 2 holds, then Equation 1 certainly holds.
See [CKS08], [HC08] for an explanation and a proof.
Additionally we need the “Additive double BDH Trapdoor Test” and the “Multiplicative double BDH
Trapdoor Test” for Strategy 9:
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Theorem 2 (Additive double BDH Trapdoor Test). Let e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing, where
G,GT are two cyclic groups of prime order p. Let P ∈ G be a generator of G. Suppose B1, D1 ∈
G, y1, y2, z ∈ Zp are mutually independent random variables. Define B2 := y1P − zB1 and D2 :=
y2P − zD1. Further, suppose that A,C are random variables in G and T1, T2 are random variables in
GT , each of which is defined as some function of (A,C,B1, D1) and (A,C,B2, D2). Then we have:
(i) B2 and D2 are uniformly distributed over G (guaranteed by y1 and y2), as is B2 +D2.
(ii) B1 and B2 are independent and D1 and D2 are independent and B2 and D2 are independent, and
B1 +D1 and B2 +D2 are independent (also due to y1 and y2).
(iii) If B1 = b1P,B2 = b2P,D1 = d1P,D2 = d2P , then the probability that the truth value of
T z1 T2
?= e(A,C)y1+y2 (3)
does not agree with the truth value of
T1
?= e(A,C)b1e(A,C)d1 ∧ T2 ?= e(A,C)b2e(A,C)d2 (4)
is at most 1/p, moreover, if Equation 4 holds, then Equation 3 certainly holds.
Proof. This proof is a rewrite of Cash, Kiltz and Shoup’s [CKS08] trapdoor test proof. Observe that
y1 + y2 = z(b1 + d1) + (b2 + d2). It is easy to verify that B2 + D2 is uniformly distributed over G, and
that B1 + D1, B2 + D2, z are mutually independent, from which (i) and (ii) follow. To prove (iii),
condition on fixed values of B1 + D1 and B2 + D2. In the resulting conditional probability space, z is
uniformly distributed over Zp, while (b1 +d1), (b2 +d2), e(A,C), T1 and T2 are fixed. If Equation 4 holds,
then by multiplying together the two equations in Equation 4, we see that Equation 3 certainly holds.
Conversely, if Equation 4 does not hold, we show that Equation 3 holds with probability at most 1/p.
Observe that Equation 3 is equivalent to(
T1
e(A,C)b1+d1
)z
=
e(A,C)b2+d2
T2
. (5)
It is not hard to see that if T1 = e(A,C)b1+d1 and T2 6= e(A,C)b2+d2 , then Equation 5 certainly does not
hold. This leaves us with the case T1 6= e(A,C)b1+d1 . But in this case, the left hand side of Equation 5
is a random element of GT (since z is uniformly distributed in Zp), but the right hand side is a fixed
element of GT . Thus, Equation 5 holds with probability 1/p in this case.
Theorem 3 (Multiplicative double BDH Trapdoor Test). 2 Let e : G ×G → GT be a bilinear pairing,
where G,GT are two cyclic groups of prime order p. Let P ∈ G be a generator of G. Suppose B1, C1 ∈
G, y1, y2, z ∈ Zp are mutually independent random variables. Define B2 := y1P − zB1 and C2 :=
y2P − zC1. Further, suppose that A is a random variables in G and T1, T2 are random variables in GT ,
each of which is defined as some function of (A,B1, C1) and (A,B2, C2). Then we have:
(i) B2 and C2 are uniformly distributed over G (guaranteed by y1 and y2), and e(B2, C2) is uniformly
distributed over GT .
(ii) B1 and B2 are independent and C1 and C2 are independent and B2 and C2 are independent, and
e(B1, C1) and e(B2, C2) are independent (also due to y1 and y2).
(iii) If B1 = b1P,B2 = b2P,C1 = c1P,C2 = c2P , then the probability that the truth value of
T2
T1
z2
?=
e(A,P )y1y2
e(A,C1)y1e(A,B1)y2
(6)
does not agree with the truth value of
T1
?= e(A,P )b1c1 ∧ T2 ?= e(A,P )b2c2 (7)
is at most 2/p, moreover, if Equation 7 holds, then Equation 6 certainly holds.
2If this test was implemented with B2 = y1P − z1bP and C2 = y2P − z2cP , then the probability that Equation 7 holds
would be 1
p2
. We use z instead of z1 and z2 because we need Theorem 2 simultaneously.
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Proof. Observe that y1y2 = (zb1 + b2)(zc1 + c2) = z2b1c1 + zb1c2 + zb2c1 + b2c2. It is easy to verify that
e(B2, C2) is uniformly distributed over GT , and that e(B1, C1), e(B2, C2), z are mutually independent,
from which (i) and (ii) follow. To prove (iii), condition on fixed values of e(B1, C1) and e(B2, C2). In
the resulting conditional probability space, z is uniformly distributed over Zp, while b1c1, b2c2, A, T1 and
T2 are fixed. If Equation 7 on the preceding page holds, then by multiplying together the two equations
in Equation 7 on the previous page, we see that Equation 6 on the preceding page certainly holds.
Conversely, if Equation 7 on the previous page does not hold, we show that Equation 6 on the preceding
page holds with probability at most 2/p. Observe that Equation 6 on the previous page is equivalent to(
T1
e(A,P )b1c1
)z2
=
e(A,P )b2c2
T2
. (8)
It is not hard to see that if T1 = e(A,P )b1c1 and T2 6= e(A,P )b2c2 , then Equation 8 certainly does not
hold. This leaves us with the case T1 6= e(A,P )b1c1 . But in this case, the left hand side of Equation 8 is
the square of a random element of GT . Since z is uniformly distributed in Zp, z2 is uniformly distributed
over half of Zp as half of the elements of Zp are quadratic residues. On the other hand, the right hand
side of 8 is a fixed element of GT . Thus, Equation 8 holds with probability 2/p in this case.
5 Security proof for the certificateless key agreement scheme
We will prove that the certificateless key agreement scheme is a secure key agreement scheme in the ran-
dom oracle model under the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) assumption and the computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. The CBDH the assumption states that given {aP, bP, cP} ∈ G3
it is hard to compute e(P, P )abc ∈ GT . Let Z be an algorithm that takes as input a triple {aP, bP, cP} ∈
G3, and outputs an element Z ∈ GT . We define the CBDH advantage of Z to be
Pr
[
a, b, c
$← Zp : Z(aP, bP, cP ) = e(P, P )abc
]
The CDH assumption states that given {aP, bP} ∈ G2 it is hard to compute abP ∈ G. Let Z be an
algorithm that takes as input the pair {aP, bP} ∈ G2, and outputs an element T ∈ G. We define the
CDH advantage of Z to be
Pr
[
a, b
$← Zp : Z(aP, bP ) = abP
]
To relate the advantage of an adversary against our protocol to the above assumptions, we use a
classical reduction approach. We assume that an adversary M has an advantage in winning the game
outlined in Section 2.1 on page 3. Additionally, the adversaryM may query the random oracles H1, H2,
and H3. In the following, the challenger B is interested to use the adversary M to turn M’s advantage
in distinguishing a random session key from the correct session key in an advantage to solve either the
computational Diffie-Hellman problem or the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. Let q0 be
the maximum number of sessions that any one party may have. We assume that the adversaryM makes
at most q1 distinctive H1 queries. The adversary may make any number of H2 queries or H3 queries. At
the end of the game, M outputs its guess bˆ ∈ {0, 1} for b. Let AdvM(k)[Π] be the advantage that the
adversary M has against the protocol, i.e. the event that bˆ = b and M wins the game.
Theorem 4. If there exists an adversary that has an advantage against our certificateless key agreement
scheme (AdvM(k)[Π]), the challenger B can use this adversary to solve either the computational Diffie-
Hellman or the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. We show that the success probability of
any adversary against the scheme is limited by
AdvM(k)[Π] ≤ 9q0q21 max
(
AdvB(k)[CDH], AdvB(k)[CBDH]
)
where AdvB(k)[CDH] is the advantage that the challenger gets in solving the computational Diffie-
Hellman problem given security parameter k using the adversary and AdvB(k)[CBDH] is the advantage
that the challenger gets in solving the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem given security pa-
rameter k using the adversary.
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Strategy 1 2 3/4(mirr.) 5/6(mirr.) 7/8(mirr.) 9
Value at party p I J I J I J I J I J I J
sH1(IDp) c c c c c c c c
sH3(H1(IDp)) c c c c c c c c
xp / xpP c/r c/r c/r c/r c/r c/r c/r c/r
rp c c c c c c c c
Embedding in xIxJP rIrJP rIxJP/rJxIP K L N
Problem type CDH CDH CDH CBDH CBDH CBDH
c = corrupt, r = replace, mirr. = swap columns I and J
Strategy 1 - 4 are related to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, Strategies 5 - 9 are related
to the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. In the proof, the problem is always embedded
in the values that the adversary may not corrupt or replace.
Table 1: Possible corrupt queries sorted by strategy
We note that the CBDH problem is strictly weaker than the CDH problem. Thus, an adversary that
is able to solve the CDH problem will also be able to solve the CBDH problem. We differentiate between
these two problems because security against a Type II adversary is based solely on the CDH problem,
whereas security against a Type I adversary is based on both the CDH problem and the CBDH problem.
5.1 Possible strategies for the challenger
Before the game starts, the challenger B tries to guess the test session. To this end, B randomly selects
two indexes I, J ∈ {1, . . . , q1} : I 6= J that represent the Ith and the J th distinct query to the H1 oracle.
The probability that B chooses I and J correctly is (as there are at most q1 entries in H1)
1
q1(q1 − 1) >
1
q21
B chooses T ∈ {1, . . . , q0} and thus determines the test oracle ΠTI,J , which is correct with probability
larger than 1
q0q21
. If B did not guess the test session correctly, B aborts the game.
In order to use the adversaryM to gain an advantage in computing the CBDH or the CDH challenge,
the challenger B will guess the parts of the key in the session corresponding to the test query that the
adversary may not learn. Depending on the chosen strategy, B aborts the game whenever M’s queries
target one of the forbidden elements. Otherwise, the game proceeds as usual. There are nine choices for
B (see also Table 1):
1. The adversary may neither learn the secret value of IDI nor of IDJ .
2. The adversary may neither learn the ephemeral private key of IDI nor of IDJ .
3. The adversary may neither learn the secret value of IDJ nor replace the public key of IDJ and
may also not learn the ID-based private key of IDI .
4. The adversary may neither learn the ephemeral private key of IDJ nor the secret value of IDI .
5. The adversary may neither learn the ephemeral private key of IDI nor the secret value of IDJ .
6. The adversary may neither learn the secret value of IDI nor replace the secret value of IDI and
may also not learn the ID-based private key of IDJ .
7. The adversary may neither learn the ephemeral private key of IDJ nor the ID-based private key
of IDI .
8. The adversary may neither learn the ephemeral private key of IDI nor the ID-based private key
of IDJ .
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ID H1(ID) l
$← Zp
ID1 l1P l1
. . . . . . . . .
IDI bP ⊥
. . . . . . . . .
IDJ cP ⊥
. . . . . . . . .
Instead of choosing H1(IDi) at random from G, B chooses li ∈ Zp at random, records it, and sets
H1(IDi) to liP . For Strategy 5, 7 and 9, the Ith entry is set to H1(IDI) = bP ; for Strategy 6 and
8, the J th entry is set to H1(IDJ) = bP . For Strategy 9 the J th entry is set to H1(IDJ) = cP .
bP and cP are taken from the inputs to the BDH challenge. As bP and cP are random in G, this
modification is indistinguishable for any adversary. The table above shows the H1 oracle for Strategy
9 as an example.
Table 2: Modified H1 oracle
9. The adversary may neither learn the ID-based private key of IDI nor of IDJ .
As there are nine strategies, the probability that B does not abort the game after B selected the strategy
and the test session beforehand is now larger than 1
9q0q21
. The adversary may learn the key generation
centre’s master secret only in Strategy 1,2,3, and 4. Furthermore, B replaces the H2 oracle by a table
which records input/output pairs. If a query is made that matches one of the previous inputs, the
corresponding output is returned, otherwise, a value from the respective output domain is chosen at
random, the new input/output pair is added to the list and the value is returned. The H1 and H3 oracle
operate as explained in Table 2 and Table 3 on the next page respectively.
5.1.1 Relation to the security model
We gave a list of desirable notions of security in Section 2 on page 2 and would like to analyse the
security of the protocol in relation to the strategies. We note that UKS attacks are not a problem as the
key derivation function H2 uses the identities of the parties as input and would output different keys in
the event of an UKS attack. Furthermore, the identity-based public keys are derived from the identity’s
name and prevent UKS attacks, too. Basic impersonation attacks are not possible as it is necessary to
know the private keys of a party to compute K,K ′, L, L′, N and N ′ which are inputs to the key derivation
function H2. Weak perfect forward secrecy is guaranteed by the proof for Strategy 2. Resistance to key
compromise impersonation attacks is also proved using Strategy 2. Resistance to (partial) disclosure
of ephemeral secrets is proven in all strategies except Strategy 2, where Strategies 1, 3 and 9 are most
important: Strategy 1 also provides security against leakage of ephemeral secrets to the key generation
centre or an adversary who compromised both identity based private keys, Strategy 3 provides security
against leakage of ephemeral secrets to an adversary who replaced the certificateless public key of one
identity and corrupted the ID-based public key of the other identity, Strategy 9 provides security against
leakage of ephemeral secrets to a adversary who replaces the certificateless public keys of both identities.
5.2 Behaviour of the challenger based on the chosen strategy
To solve the computational DH problem using M, B is given the values (aP, bP ) and B’s task is to
compute abP . To solve this problem, B uses the H2 oracle. The bilinear pairing is used for consistency
checks.
To solve the computational BDH problem using M, B is given the values (aP, bP, cP ) and B’s task
is to compute e(P, P )abc. To solve this problem, B uses the H2 and the H1 oracle. The H3 oracle is used
for consistency checks and operates as in Table 3 on the next page.
The session key SK is generated by querying H2 on (IDi, IDj , riP, xiP, rjP, xjP, rirjP, xixjP,
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gi ∈ G H3(gi) yi $← Zp z $← Zp
H1(IDI) = bP ytbdh1P − zbP ytbdh1 z
H1(IDJ) = cP ytbdh2P − zcP ytbdh2 z
g1 y1P y1 ⊥
. . . . . . . . . ⊥
Instead of choosing H3(gi) for gi ∈ G at random from G, B chooses yi ∈ Zp at random, records it,
and sets H3(gi) to yiP . For Strategy 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, the oracle is patched before the game starts by
setting H3(bP ) = ytbdh1P − zbP . For Strategy 9, the oracle is additionally patched before the game
starts with H3(cP ) = ytbdh2P − zcP . bP and cP are taken from the inputs to the BDH challenge. As
the pre-patched values are completely re-randomized, this modification is indistinguishable for any
adversary. The table above shows the H3 oracle for Strategy 9 as an example.
Table 3: Modified H3 oracle suitable for twin bilinear Diffie-Hellman
rixjP, rjxiP, K, K
′, L, L′, N, N ′) where
K = e(H1(IDj), P )ris︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1
· e(H1(IDi), P )rjs︸ ︷︷ ︸
K2
,
L = e(H1(IDj), P )sxi︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1
· e(H1(IDi), P )sxj︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2
, N = e(H1(IDi), H1(IDj))s
Depending on the chosen strategy, B embeds the challenge in the test query and answers the test
query as specified in Section 2.1 on page 3.
5.2.1 Patching the H2 oracle
B has to maintain consistency between the H2 oracle and session key reveal queries, as B will not be
able to compute all data necessary to query the H2 oracle for a valid session key in some instances
(e.g. if certificateless public keys have been replaced by the adversary). If B has been asked on the H2
oracle first and is then later asked a matching session key reveal query, B is always able to answer these
requests correctly (it uses its decisional oracles that are explained in the proofs for respective strategies,
see Section 5.4 on the next page). However, if B is asked a session key reveal query for which no matching
H2 query exists yet, B proceeds as follows: B inserts all available data and all data that B is able to
compute (see also section 5.3) into the H2 oracle but may have to leave some fields (like K and K ′ or
L and L′ or N and N ′) empty. B chooses a random value from H2’s output domain as the session key
and records that value together with the incomplete H2 query data. For the following H2 queries, B first
checks if one of the incomplete entries of the H2 oracle matches M’s query data by using the respective
decisional oracle(s). If that is the case, B records the complete information submitted byM and returns
the H2 entry. B additionally fills up all long term values that it can determine (even if it is not able to
fill a H2 entry completely). If B finds no matching entry, B simply generates a new H2 entry as usual.
5.3 Handling a session key reveal query for sessions Πti,j where party i and
j are not participating in the test query
Without loss of generality, we assume that i is the initiator of the session. Given party i that has
incoming message (rMjP, xMjP ) (where Mj indicates that the values may be adversarial controlled)
and that thus accepts, the challenger knows at least the identity based private keys and the ephemeral
private key of party i, i.e. the challenger knows sH1(IDi), sH3(H1(IDi)), ri. The adversary may have
replaced the certificateless public key of party i with xMiP . To obtain a session key, party i has to query
the H2 oracle with the session data (as explained in Section 3.3 on page 7) on the following elements:
SK = H2(i, j, riP, xMiP, rMjP, xMjP, rirMjP, xMixMjP, rixMjP, xMirMjP,
K,K ′, L, L′, N,N ′)
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Besides the public values i, j, riP, xMiP, rMjP, xMjP that are part of the H2 query, the challenger acting
as party i is able to compute the following values knowing its (possibly corrupted) private information
sH1(IDi), sH3(H1(IDi)), ri:
rirMjP trivially, by computing ri(rMjP )
rixMjP by computing ri(xMJP )
K due to the patched H1 oracle (see Table 2 on page 12), the challenger knows logP H1(IDi) = li and
logP H1(IDj) = lj . Thus K can be computed as
K = e(H1(IDj), sP )rie(lisP, rMjP )
K ′ just like for K, the challenger knows logP H3(H1(IDi)) = yi and logP H3( H1(IDj)) = yj (see
Table 3 on the previous page). Thus K ′ can be computed as
K ′ = e(H3(H1(IDj)), sP )rie(yisP, rMjP )
L Knowing li and lj from the H1 oracle computing L is easy:
L = e(lj(xMiP ), sP )e(lisP, xMjP )
L′ can be computed similarly, just like K ′ above.
N and N ′ are easy as the ID-based private keys are known.
The only missing values are xMixMjP and xMirMjP which cannot be computed by the challenger.
However, as we point out in the proof for Strategy 1 in Section 5.4, the challenger is still able to answer
session state reveal and H2 queries consistently: If the challenger is asked a H2 query first and then
later asked a matching session state reveal query, the challenger can identify the corresponding H2 entry
by checking for all entries if e(xiP, xjP ) = e(xixjP, P ) and if e(xMiP, rMjP ) = e(xMirMjP ). If the
challenger is asked a session state reveal query, but there is no matching H2 entry, the challenger can
create a new random value from the output domain of H2 and assign it to the incomplete entry. The
challenger checks the subsequent queries of the adversary to the H2 oracle and is able to answer the
queries correctly by using the pairing as above.
In the following, we will split the challenger’s behaviour based on the strategy chosen in Section 5.1
on page 11. Additionally, we omit the indices ti,j with respect to key computations for specific sessions
to increase readability. Usually it is evident for which particular session the computations are needed.
For the proof we assume that the adversary M does not get an advantage in outputting its guess bˆ for
b unless M queries the H2 oracle on the session key.
5.4 Proofs for Strategy 1 to 9
5.4.1 Strategy 1
The allowed corrupt queries for the adversary are listed in Table 1 on page 11. The challenger B
wants to use the adversary M to solve the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. The input for B is
(aP, bP ) ∈ G2 and B’s goal is to compute abP . To this end, B sets the certificateless public key of IDI
to aP and the certificateless public key of IDJ to bP . B uses the pairing to check whether the queries
of the adversary to the H2 oracle are valid: by computing e(aP, bP ) = e(abP, P ), B is able to identify
valid queries. As soon as B finds such a query, B aborts the game and returns abP as solution of the
CDH challenge.
The probability that B is able to find a solution to the CDH challenge is
AdvB(k)[CDH] ≥ Adv
M(k)[Π]
9q0q21
B is able to compute all other elements (xIxJP, K, K ′, L, L′, N, N ′) that are necessary for H2 queries
as the respective private values are under B’s control. If M is a Type II adversary as explained in
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Section 2.1 on page 3, B gives s to M at the start of the game. We note that as B knows s, B is able
to generate ID-based private keys for any identity; thus the game does not have to be changed for Type
II adversaries. We note that M is allowed to replace the certificateless public key of IDI and/or IDJ
after the test query has been issued.
IfM replaces the certificateless public keys of other identities and asks reveal queries, B first uses the
pairing to check for matching queries to the H2 oracle. If no matching query is found, B first generates
a random value v of the output domain of H2, inserts the available session data together with v into the
H2 table as described in Section 5.2.1 on page 13 (i.e. everything including the certificateless public keys;
except xixjP which B cannot compute) and returns v. If B is then later asked H2 queries containing
the correct xixjP and the certificateless keys xiP and xjP , B is able to tell so by using the pairing
computation and completes the entries in the H2 table wherever possible.
5.4.2 Strategy 2
The allowed corrupt queries for the adversary are listed in Table 1 on page 11. The challenger B
wants to use the adversary M to solve the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. The input for B is
(aP, bP ) ∈ G2 and B’s goal is to compute abP . To this end, B sets the ephemeral key of IDI to aP and
the ephemeral key of IDJ to bP in the test query. B uses the pairing to check whether the queries of
the adversary to the H2 oracle are valid: by computing e(aP, bP ) = e(abP, P ), B is able to identify valid
queries. As soon as B find such a query, B aborts the game and returns abP as solution of the CDH
challenge.
The probability that B is able to find a solution to the CDH challenge is
AdvB(k)[CDH] ≥ Adv
M(k)[Π]
9q0q21
AsM is allowed to replace the certificateless public keys of any identity, B uses the technique described
in Strategy 1 to decide how to answer reveal queries and H2 queries.
5.4.3 Strategy 3 and 4
The allowed corrupt queries for the adversary are listed in Table 1 on page 11. For Strategy 3, we want
to embed the CDH challenge in rIxJP , because the input to other values used in the key derivation
function can be corrupted by the adversary. Here, B selects the master private key s $← Zp. B is able to
provide ID-based secret keys for all identities, as B is in possession of the master secret key. Furthermore,
B sets the certificateless public key of IDI to xIP = aP and the ephemeral public key of party IDJ to
rJP = bP in session ΠTI,J . If the adversary is a Type II adversary as described in Section 2.1 on page 3,
then B gives s to M at the start of the game.
Similar to Strategy 1 and 2, B checks the H2 queries for entries where
e(P, rJxIP )
?= e(aP, bP )
As soon as B finds such an entry, B aborts the game and returns rJxIP as solution to the BDH challenge.
The probability that this happens is lower bounded by
AdvB(k)[CDH] ≥ Adv
M(k)[Π]
9q0q21
B uses the techniques described in Strategy 1 to deal with replaced certificateless keys of identities other
than IDI . We note thatM is allowed to replace the certificateless public key of IDI after the test query
has been issued.
We note that as Strategy 4 is symmetric to Strategy 3, its probability of success is equal to the
probability of success for Strategy 3. Only IDI and IDJ are exchanged and the computational BDH
challenge is embedded in rIxJP instead of rJxIP .
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5.4.4 Strategy 5 and 6
The allowed corrupt queries for Strategy 5 for the adversary are listed in Table 1 on page 11. The
BDH challenge can only be embedded in L2 if Strategy 5 is chosen, because the input to all other
values used in the key derivation function can be corrupted by the adversary. To accomplish this, the
challenger B sets the master public key to aP and implements the H1 oracle as described in Table 2
on page 12, thus H1(IDI) = bP . B patches the H3 oracle as described in Table 3 on page 13, thus
H3(H1(IDI)) = H3(bP ) = ytbdh1P − zbP . B can still generate private keys for all identities except IDI
by computing sH(IDi) = liaP and sH3(H1(IDi)) = yiaP . Additionally, B sets the certificateless public
key of IDJ to cP .
A problem for B arises when the adversary asks session key reveal queries for other sessions than the
test session that include IDI and IDJ , or for sessions that include IDI and another party for which the
adversary issued a replace public key query. Whenever B is asked a reveal query, B first checks if the
key derivation function H2 was asked with a matching session string involving both IDI and IDJ . As
B is unable to compute L, B uses the twin bilinear Diffie-Hellman trapdoor (see Theorem 1 on page 8)
to check if M submitted a valid query, i.e. if the query should be answered with a record from H2 (if
such a record exists). The challenger extracts the discrete logarithm for IDJ ’s private keys, lJ and yJ
from the H1 and H3 oracle respectively (H3(H1(IDJ)) = H3(lJP ) = yJP and B is able to extract both
lJ and yJ). Then, B extracts L and L′ from each entry that matches the session for which the reveal
query is being asked, computes L1 = e(lJaP, xIP ), L′1 = e(yJaP, xIP ) and checks if(
L
L1
)z
· L
′
L′1
=
(
e(H1(IDJ), P )sxI · e(H1(IDI), P )sxJ
e(lJaP, xIP )
)z
·e(H3(H1(IDJ)), P )
sxI · e(H3(H1(IDI)), P )sxJ
e(yJaP, xIP )
=
(
e(lJP, aP )xI · e(bP, P )ac
e(lJaP, xIP )
)z
·e(yJP, P )
axI · e(ytbdh1P − zbP, P )ac
e(yJaP, xIP )
= e(bP, P )acz1 · e(ytbdh1P − zbP, P )ac
= e(P, P )z1abce(P, P )ytbdh1ac−z1abc = e(P, P )ytbdh1ac
?= e(aP, cP )ytbdh1
As soon as M submits such an entry to the H2 oracle, B aborts the game and returns
L
L1
=
e(H1(IDJ), P )sxI · e(H1(IDI), P )sxJ
e(lJaP, xIP )
=
e(lJP, aP )xI · e(bP, P )ac
e(lJaP, xIP )
= e(P, P )abc
as solution to the BDH challenge.
B uses the same strategy for reveal queries to sessions of IDI where the adversary replaced the
certificateless public key of IDj , except that B does not abort the game if a matching H2 query is found
but returns the correct H2 value. If no matching H2 query is found, B proceeds as in Section 5.2.1 on
page 13. If the adversary replaces the certificateless public key of IDI , B additionally uses the strategy
described in Strategy 1. We note thatM is allowed to replace the certificateless public key of IDJ after
the test query has been issued.
The probability that B is able to find a solution to the CBDH challenge is
AdvB(k)[CBDH] ≥ Adv
M(k)[Π]
9q0q21
Strategy 6 is symmetric to Strategy 5, so it has the same probability (only IDI and IDJ are exchanged).
The BDH challenge is embedded in L1 instead of L2.
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5.4.5 Strategy 7 and 8
The allowed corrupt queries for the adversary are listed in Table 1 on page 11. The BDH challenge can
only be embedded in K2, because the input to all other values used in the key derivation function can
be corrupted by the adversary. Using this strategy, the challenger sets the master public key sP to aP
(notice that B does not know s). B changes the mode of operation of the H1 oracle so that H1 operates as
in Table 2 on page 12, thus H1(IDI) = bP . B patches the H3 oracle as described in Table 3 on page 13,
thus H3(H1(IDI)) = H3(bP ) = ytbdh1P − zbP . B can still generate private keys for all identities except
IDI by computing sH(IDi) = liaP and sH3(H1(IDi)) = yiaP . As queries for IDI ’s private keys were
ruled out, this does not affect the overall success probability. Additionally, B sets the ephemeral public
key of party J 6= I that participates in the T th oracle ΠTI,J to cP .
If the adversary has an advantage in this strategy, thenM needs to query the H2 oracle on the session
key. To distinguish this entry from other H2 queries, B re-computes K1 = e(aP, P )lJrI and similarly the
K ′1 = e(aP, P )
yJrI . Then, B searches in the table of the H2 oracle for an entry where(
K
K1
)z
· K
′
K ′1
= e(aP, cP )ytbdh1
B aborts the game as soon as such an entry is submitted to the H2 oracle and returns K/K1 as solution to
the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman challenge. The probability that this happens is lower bounded
by
AdvB(k)[CBDH] ≥ Adv
M(k)[Π]
9q0q21
A problem for B occurs if M replaces certificateless public keys. As B knows the ID-based private keys
for all identities except IDI , B can compute K,K ′, L, L′, N and N ′ for any session except for sessions
involving IDI . B may be unable to compute xixjP if M replaced both xiP and xjP but can use the
pairing as described in Strategy 1. For reveal queries involving IDI and replaced certificateless public
keys, B uses the H3 oracle as described in Strategy 5.
Strategy 8 is symmetric to Strategy 7, so it has the same probability (only IDI and IDJ are ex-
changed). The BDH challenge is embedded in K1 instead of K2.
5.4.6 Strategy 9
The allowed corrupt queries for the adversary are listed in Table 1 on page 11. The BDH challenge will
be embedded in N . To accomplish this, the challenger sets the master secret key to aP , H1(IDI) = bP ,
and H1(IDJ) = cP . Additionally, the H3 oracle (see Table 3 on page 13) is modified before the game
starts so that H3(H1(IDI)) = H3(bP ) = ytbdh1P − zbP and H3(H1(IDJ)) = H3(cP ) = ytbdh2P − zcP .
A problem for B arises when the adversary asks session key reveal queries for other sessions than the
test session that include IDI and IDJ , or for sessions where the adversaryM replaces the certificateless
public keys of any of the target identities. In these cases the challenger is unable to computer neither
N nor L. Whenever B is asked a session key reveal query, B first checks if H2 was asked with a
matching session string involving both IDI and IDJ . As B is generally unable to compute either L
or N , B uses the trapdoor as explained in Theorem 3 on page 9 for N and Theorem 2 on page 9 for
L to check if M submitted a valid query, i.e. if the query should be answered with a record from H2
(if such a record exists). To this end, B extracts L, L′, N and N ′ from each entry that matches the
session for which the reveal query is being asked, and checks if N
′
Nz2
= e(aP,P )
ytbdh1
ytbdh2
e(cP,aP )
ytbdh1 e(bP,aP )
ytbdh2
and
if LzL′ = e(aP, cP )ytbdh1+ytbdh2 . If no matching record exists, B patches the H2 oracle as explained in
Section 5.2.1 on page 13. As soon asM submits such an entry to the H2 oracle, B aborts the game and
returns N as solution to the BDH challenge. The probability that this happens is lower bounded by
AdvB(k)[CBDH] ≥ Adv
M(k)[Π]
9q0q21
B is able to distinguish between H2 queries that have correct session data and H2 queries that have
invalid session data and is thus able to operate the H2 oracle consistently. B may have to use the
techniques explained in Strategy 1 and Strategy 5 to operate the H2 oracle.
Theorem 1 follows from the above strategies.
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6 Conclusion
We give the strongest security model for certificateless encryption and relate it to Type I and Type
II adversaries [Den08]. We give the first construction for a strongly secure one round certificateless
key agreement scheme that is proven to be secure in the random oracle model, if the computational
bilinear Diffie-Hellman and the computational Diffie-Hellman assumptions hold. This enables us to
positively answer Swanson’s [Swa08, Chapter 7] first question, whether it is even possible to construct
a certificateless key agreement scheme that meets the extended eCK model. The protocol is compatible
with existing certificateless key infrastructures and can thus be deployed easily. It is furthermore a
natural complement to certificateless encryption, which brings us to Swanson’s second question: We
show that a practical protocol for CL-AKE exists, although it is computationally expensive. We also
show how the computational cost can be reduced if we use gap assumptions. We prove our scheme to
be more secure than ID-based schemes, in the sense that the KGC can be more actively trying to learn
secrets. To answer Swanson’s third question, whether the flexibility of certificateless schemes is worth
the increased likeliness of vulnerabilities, we note that the ability of the adversary to replace public keys
does not necessarily have to introduce vulnerabilites. CL-AKE schemes therefore combine user flexibility
with enhanced privacy.
It remains to devise computationally more efficient one round protocols for certificateless key agree-
ment proven secure with respect to standard computational problems such as DH or BDH. Furthermore,
a proof for a certificateless key agreement scheme in the standard model would be very interesting.
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